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Abstract Forced displacement and resettlement is a
pervasive challenge being contemplated across the
social sciences. Scholarly literature, however, often
fails to engage complexities of power in understanding
socio-environmental interactions in resettlement pro-
cesses. Addressing Zimbabwe’s Tokwe-Mukosi flood
disaster resettlement, we explore hegemonic uses of
state power during the pre- and post-flood induced
resettlement processes. We examine how state power
exercised through local government, financial, and
security institutions impacts community vulnerabili-
ties during forced resettlement processes, while
furthering capitalist agendas, drawing insights from
analysing narratives between 2010 and 2021. Con-
cerns abound that multiple ministries, the police, and
the army undermined displaced people’s resilience,
including through inadequate compensation, with
state institutions neglecting displaced communities
during encampment by inadequately meeting physical
security, health, educational, and livestock production
needs. We explore how forcibly resettling encamped
households to a disputed location is not only an
ongoing perceived injustice regionally but also a
continuing reference point in resettlement discussions
countrywide, reflecting concerns that land use and
economic reconfigurations in resettlement can under-
mine subsistence livelihoods while privileging certain
values and interests over others. Policy lessons
highlight the need for reviewing disaster management
legislation, developing compensation guidelines and
reviewing encampment practices. Analytically, les-
sons point to how state power may be studied in
relation to perspectives on the destruction of flood
survivors’ connections to place, people and liveli-
hoods, underscoring the critical need for theorising the
relationships between power dynamics and diverse
experiences around displacement.
Keywords Flood-induced resettlement 
Displacement  Power  political ecology  Disaster
Introduction
Globally, the disproportionate impacts of flood-in-
duced displacement, predominantly on low-income
and low-lying households, are raising pressing con-
cerns for resettling internally displaced communities
(United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
[UNDRR], 2019). ‘Resettlement’—a complex and
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multi-faceted phenomenon frequently used by gov-
ernments to permanently move communities from
perceived dangerous situations to new locations
(Mortreux et al., 2018)—has recently resurged to
prominence as a point of debate (Ferris, 2014;
McMichael et al., 2019), particularly where govern-
ment infrastructure and development projects led to
diverse social, economic and political inequities (Hino
et al., 2017; McNamara et al., 2018; Weir & Pittock,
2017). In response to observations that forced reset-
tlement is still understudied empirically and under-
theorised (McMichael et al. (2019), we draw on
resettlement studies and critical political ecology
fields, to explore resettlement challenges in Zim-
babwe, where disasters such as cyclones and floods
have, in recent years, layered onto ongoing political-
economic instability.
In this study we focus on the 2014 Tokwe-Mukosi
flood disaster which displaced close to 50,000 vil-
lagers (Chitimira, 2017). Tokwe-Mukosi is Zim-
babwe’s first major post-independence dam-induced
displacement in which climate stresses contributed
significantly to both the immediate time of the disaster
and the subsequent struggles. While not ignoring the
struggles of communities resettled before the Tokwe-
Mukosi flood disaster, we focus more on the popula-
tion affected by the 2014 floods. As the first major
disaster to displace such a significant number of
people in Zimbabwe, it set a precedent for future
resettlements and remains a contentious reference
point for discussing a broader constellation of disasters
in Zimbabwe. Building on insights from the first
author’s visit to the Tokwe-Mukosi area in 2014 and
ethnographic research with flood disaster survivors in
other regions of Zimbabwe over the last several years
by the second author, we critically analyse literature
from 2010 to 2021 to probe evolving themes on flood
and dam-induced resettlement and power dynamics
centred on the struggles that occurred in Tokwe-
Mukosi. Studies on the Tokwe-Mukosi disaster have
focused on human rights (Chitimira, 2017; Hove,
2016), policy (Chipangura et al., 2019), vulnerability
(Mavhura et al., 2017; Mukwashi, 2017; Mutangi &
Mutari, 2014), livelihoods (Chazireni & Chigonda,
2018), stakeholder coordination (Zikhali, 2018), and
traditional leadership (Tarisayi, 2018) perspectives.
Yet, few scholarly sources have explored how state
power influenced vulnerabilities and undermined
resilience building in the Tokwe-Mukosi flood-
disaster resettlement processes. We therefore examine
how the state–using the Ministry of Finance and
Economic Development (MFED), Ministry of Local
Government and Public Works (MLGPW), the Zim-
babwe Republic Policy (ZRP) and the Zimbabwe
National Army (ZNA) to control the compensation
processes–encamped internally displaced persons
(IDPs) in a transit camp, and eventually forced them
to settle in a disputed Chingwizi site, thereby exacer-
bating their vulnerability. The overall aim of the study
is to explore the impact of the hegemonic uses of state
power in pre- and post-flood induced resettlement
processes, using the 2014 Tokwe-Mukosi flood disas-
ter as a case study.
We draw on discussions in political ecology
scholarship which offers analytical tools for moving
beyond simplifying institutional rhetoric about resi-
lience to explore how various faces of state power can
serve capitalist interests that increase environmental
vulnerability (Arnall, 2014; Cote & Nightingale,
2012). The following research questions drive this
study: (i) What processes characterised the Tokwe-
Mukosi pre- and post-flood induced resettlement
period? (ii) How did state power contribute to the
vulnerability of the Tokwe-Mukosi communities’
forced resettlement? And (iii) Which lessons from
the Tokwe-Mukosi resettlement process have been or
have not been acted upon? We introduce our political
ecology analysis in the next section, identifying gaps
in flood-induced resettlement literature that beckon
this analytic turn. The third section then introduces the
Tokwe-Mukosi resettlement context along with our
methodological approach. The fourth section dis-
cusses the results of our analysis before moving to the
fifth and final section, where we draw out some critical
implications, integrating our observations from
Cyclone Idai in 2019 and Chilonga displacements in
2021.
Contextualising ‘‘resettlement’’: experiences,
institutional shortcomings and political ecology
Literature on resettlement has embraced various, at
times countervailing, tendencies. John et al. (2019)
and Correa (2011) argue that preventive resettlement
should be carried out as a last resort when flood
hazards are uncontrollable and of high risk. Such pre-
emptive measures reduce the exposure of vulnerable
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groups and their assets to flood risk by physically
removing them from the threatened location to a safer
location (Klepp & Herbeck, 2016; Mortreux et al.,
2018). McMichael et al. (2019), for example, describe
how villages in Fiji were assisted by the government to
resettle when risks of flooding reached intolerable
levels. However, resettlement can also be tied to other
non-lifesaving priorities such as political legitimacy
and identity. In India, Ghoramara and Lohachara,
where scientists expect climate change to intensify
land losses due to sea-level rise (Nandi et al., 2016),
resettlement coincided with the ruling party’s desire to
demonstrate a commitment to social welfare and
resettlement in a habitable location (Mortreux et al.,
2018). On the other hand, in the Pacific Islands,
Farbotko et al. (2016) observed that some Tuvaluans
challenged forced resettlement, risking drowning in
order to preserve their identities and homes. Con-
versely, Albert et al. (2018) noted that in Alaska,
indigenous communities in Shishmaref are yet to be
relocated since 2002 due to limited government
commitment to fund essential services, infrastructure,
and housing in the new site. The point here is that the
literature is replete with stories illustrating mis-
matches of the priorities of local communities and
those of state actors.
International frameworks, such as the Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2020
(SFDRR), are meant to encourage the development of
public policies from the national down to the local level
to address relocations of communities in disaster-prone
areas (United Nations International Strategy for Disas-
ter Reduction [UNISDR], 2015). Countries such as Fiji
(Republic of Fiji, 2017) and Kiribati (Klepp &
Herbeck, 2016), for example, have developed guide-
lines to support proactive resettlement, and John et al.
(2019) argue for the strengthening of governing
institutions responsible for implementing such plans.
However, as noted by others (van Niekerk et al., 2020)
implementing policies with targets measured against
international frameworks such as the SFDRR require
understanding the contextual historical and socioeco-
nomic environment that influences the outcomes.
Critiques of camps used to accommodate victims of
forced displacements have been ongoing for at least
close to half a century (Chambers, 1979; Hovil, 2007;
Schmidt, 2003). While governments still use camps as
the central point for offering emergency aid services
and security, these complex spaces are also hubs of
increased vulnerability due to inadequate access to
food, water, shelter, health care and other non-food
items by IDPs (Ekezie et al., 2019; Singh et al., 2016)
as well as restricted livelihood opportunities (Ekezie
et al., 2019) particularly when state institutions curtail
movements, access to resources, ownership of assets,
and employment options for displaced communities
(Bakewell, 2014). Additionally, these communities
are sometimes relocated far away from their original
location, which affects their ability to immediately
embark on productive livelihoods (Arnall et al., 2013;
Tadgell et al., 2018).
As it is the responsibility of the affected nation’s
government to sustain its citizens (Ahmad, 2017),
humanitarian assistance to IDPs by international
organisations is less established compared to refugee
settings (United Nations, 2004), and governments in
Tanzania, Zambia, Sudan, and Uganda seem to have
provided displaced communities with land without
encamping them (Bakewell, 2014). Nonetheless, site
selection is a critical aspect of the resettlement
process, ideally achieved through giving communities
the right to choose where they want to resettle (Nygren
& Wayessa, 2018) equipped with knowledge on the
level of hazard exposure which they perceive to be
manageable. Reckless and haphazard resettlement of
communities places them in the same or more
dangerous conditions than they were before. John
et al. (2019) observed that in Tanzania, the Mab-
wepande community resettled by the government due
to floods, found themselves in an area with massive
soil erosion actually increasing the risk of the floods
inundating some of the houses.
Governments have also used diverse strategies of
compensating resettled IDPs, most commonly cash
payments and land (Tadgell et al., 2018). Some
governments prefer cash compensation as it is logis-
tically more straightforward and faster to allocate than
land (Rowan, 2017). Also, Mariotti (2014) observes
that IDPs often prefer cash compensation because it is
immediate, which reduces the risks of governments
failing to fulfil their promised follow-up support; the
Gbagye tribe, which was displaced by the Nigerian
government in the late 1970s to allow the construction
of Abuja, the federal capital, has yet to be compen-
sated (Akume, 2015). Nonetheless, the value of the
cash compensation is not able to compensate for
intangible losses such as social networks, income and
culture (Al Atahar, 2014; Roca & Villares, 2012).
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To optimise cultural preservation and social net-
works, López-Carr and Marter-Kenyon (2015) suggest
the relocation of an entire village together; the
Vunidogoloa villages in Fiji maintained the same
spatial configuration when they resettled (McMichael
et al. (2019). However, agricultural livelihoods might
be under threat in the new location (Al Atahar, 2014),
such that some scholars suggest the need for develop-
ing new industries apart from agriculture and comple-
mented by both new and old skills training with a long-
term focus (Usamah & Haynes, 2012). The point here
is that displacement experiences and needs after
disasters are varied.
Miller (2020: 1572) defines just resilience ‘as the
conditions that enable people to cope with, recover
and restore their livelihoods in fair, equitable and
inclusive ways following shocks and disturbances,
such as displacement, while also maintaining essential
and valued connections to place, community and
economy.’ We argue that in studying resettlement, it is
essential to dissect how power dynamics associated
with state institutions influence resilience post disaster
and that integrating concepts of power allows for a
clearer understanding of divergent choices and
inequalities. Exploring various injustices in the reset-
tlement planning processes, while highlighting power
imbalances that scholars and practitioners need to
address, this study thus aims to apply a political
ecology analysis to understand forced resettlement
following a dam failure in a context of climate change
exacerbations. Political ecology offers avenues for de-
stabilising homogenising assumptions about policy
discourses and marginalisation, giving attention to
diverse histories, changing discourses and different
social circumstances, raising questions about whose
‘context’ matters and how particular forms of hege-
mony and power are experienced at given points in
time (Arnall, 2014; Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2021;
Spiegel, 2017; Sultana, 2020). With a political ecology
analysis of what has been termed a society-nature
interface (Ingalls & Stedman, 2016), we aim to add to
the emerging body of literature in this regard (Boon-
stra, 2016; Chandler, 2014; Cote & Nightingale, 2012;
Cretney, 2014; Evans & Reid, 2014; Fabinyi et al.,
2014; and Ingalls & Stedman, 2016). Our case study
focuses on how state actors in Zimbabwe’s Ministry of
Finance and Economic Development, Ministry of
Local Government and Public Works, courts, police,
and army influenced the resettlement processes in
Tokwe-Mukosi.
Context and methodological approach
The SFDRR supposedly informs the approach to
disaster management in Zimbabwe (Manyena, 2016).
However, the archaic Civil Protection Act of 1989,
which is still the chief law governing disaster risk
reduction in the country, does not reflect elements of
the SFDRR or its predecessor, the Hyogo Framework
for Action 2005–2015, especially regarding substan-
tially reducing risks for losses in lives, livelihood
opportunities, and property (UNISDR, 2015). As Belle
et al. (2017), Bongo et al. (2013), and Mhlanga et al.
(2019) note, the legislation is more reactive than
proactive. Our study is conducted in this context, to
critically explore how the reactive policy stance
affects resettlement during disaster-induced resettle-
ment, focusing on the unprecedented disaster in
Tokwe-Mukosi. The Tokwe-Mukosi dam is in the
Masvingo Province, south of Zimbabwe. Chivi
District, the origin of the Tokwe-Mukosi communi-
ties, receives an average annual rainfall of 400 mm
typically, but between January and March 2014,
received 850 mm of rainfall (Tarisayi, 2014). While
some resettlement efforts were underway, the inces-
sant rainfall breached the dam walls of the Tokwe-
Mukosi dam inundating 5,793 families upstream and
downstream (Mavhura et al., 2017). The government
evacuated the households to the Chingwizi Transit
Camp (CTC) and then to a subsequent resettlement
area in Mwenezi District (Mukwashi, 2017), 170 km
from the Tokwe-Mukosi dam site (Gumindoga et al.,
2014) (Fig. 1).
We used an inductive approach to understand how
the Tokwe-Mukosi community was displaced and
resettled in Chingwizi, employing document reviews
and narrative analysis (Johnston, 2014) to appreciate
different ontologies for making sense of the disaster’s
fallout. Focusing on how state actors assign particular
notions of disaster risk reduction to the resettlement
process, we recognise meaning-making as a product of
cFig. 1 Tokwe-Mukosi Dam, Chingwizi transit camp and





different subject positionalities and experiences (Pope
& Mays, 2020). Here we seek to build a politically
sensitive narrative surrounding the resettlement pro-
cesses. The first author conducted a field visit to the
Tokwe-Mukosi and CTC in 2014, providing an
opportunity to put questions to government authori-
ties. The second author has been conducting in-depth
ethnographic research in communities impacted by
Cyclone Idai in 2019 in areas near the Zimbabwe-
Mozambique border to understand their perspectives
and experiences of displacement and resettlement,
where references to the Tokwe-Mukosi resettlement
were, due to its prominence, repeatedly invoked,
alongside wider policy concerns and fears. We
collected data between May 2020 and March 2021,
through a document analysis method, focusing on
literature concerning the Tokwe-Mukosi resettlement
process and its representation, using multiple data
sources comprising scholarly sources, non-govern-
mental organisation (NGO) and government reports,
conference proceedings, and newspaper articles to fill
gaps and identify biases and inconsistencies within the
data (Silverman, 2018), enabling verification. Focus-
ing on the 2010 to 2021 period allowed for under-
standing the historical roots and injustices embedded
in the resettlement processes.
We first conducted a systematic literature search on
Web of Science and Scopus to obtain articles on
Tokwe-Mukosi, refining the search terms using var-
ious combinations of: Tokwe-Mukosi, flood, disaster,
dam, displacement, transit-camp, holding camp,
Nuanetsi, Chingwizi, ranch, resettlement and reloca-
tion. After manually removing all duplicated articles,
the process yielded only 15 articles. We then used
snowball sampling to expand the literature search,
searching for both academic and grey literature within
the references of the identified articles. We selected
articles which included the pre- and post-resettlement
process of the Tokwe-Mukosi disaster, including the
movement to CTC and the final resettlement in
Chingwizi within the Nuanetsi Ranch, as well as the
Tokwe-Mukosi dam construction period. Since we
needed current information on actions that the gov-
ernment has taken based on the resettlement process,
we included newspaper articles obtained from The
Herald and The Standard from 2018–2020, using the
same combination of search terms as used in the
systematic search. The final data set consisted of 5
government reports, 7 NGO reports, 18 journal articles
or book chapters and 25 newspaper articles. We used
thematic analysis (Chandra & Shang, 2019) employ-
ing NVivo 12. To maintain a systematic analysis, we
followed Creswell’s (2009) six-step procedure to
reiterate and reflect between the different stages and
organise and describe the vast amounts of unstructured
qualitative data in rich detail (Nowell et al., 2017),
while considering all aspects of and potential biases in
the data.
Keenly aware that documents cannot be treated as
objective reflections of reality as they represent the
views of those who write them, and are produced for
diverse purposes, complementary analyses were
derived from our research with disaster survivors in
other locations–particularly in areas heavily impacted
by Cyclone Idai, where discussion of what occurred in
Tokwe-Mukosi was a frequent point of conversation.
We also conducted an interview with personnel from
the MLGPW, as well as a constitutional law expert, in
addition to deriving insights from participating in
webinar sessions together with displaced community
members, civil society organisations and members of
parliament with experiences of displacement in their
constituencies.
Tokwe-Mukosi’s resettlement processes
Compensation and its failings
Between 2012 and December 2013, MLGPW resettled
600 of the 896 compensated households to Chisase and
Masangula areas (Catholic Commission for Justice &
Peace in Zimbabwe [CCJPZ], 2014; Chipangura et al.,
2019). Initially, MLGPW planned to resettle the
affected 6393 Tokwe-Mukosi households in three
phases by October 2015, before the anticipated filling
of the dam in December 2015 (Betera, 2014). This
figure was 48% lower than the 1,247 households that
were actually targeted for resettlement in that same
period. Most of the resettlement processes were also
reactive, as MLGPW only resettled the remaining 5793
households in the aftermath of the flood disaster
(Mavhura, 2020), such that the delayed relocation and
subsequent flooding resulted in the death of six people
from drowning, loss of crops, livestock and property
(Moyo, 2014 cited in Hove, 2016; Tarisayi, 2014).
Reasons for stalled proactive resettlement processes
included the central government’s lack of financial
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resources to compensate and transport the remaining
households and refusal by the households to be
relocated without full compensation from MFED
(Betera, 2014; Mavhura et al., 2017) to enable the
IDPs to re-establish their homes, initiate income-
generating activities, restock livestock, and fulfil food,
health and education needs (Zimbabwe Human Rights
Commission [ZHRC], 2014).
While the MLGPW compensated the Tokwe-
Mukosi IDPs using cash payments and land-for-land
strategies, only the 896 households valuated before the
flood disaster received a lump sum payment (Betera,
2014); the others only received funds in instalments,
not fully paid until five years after the displacement.
This left flood survivors unable to purchase suit-
able building material, replace lost assets or meet basic
needs in the period between eviction and rebuilding.
As a result, IDPs slept in the open and later in tents
before they managed to build any housing infrastruc-
ture (Oxfam, 2014). In contrast to the more durable
brick houses with zinc roofs (Mukwashi, 2019) built
by those compensated early, households resettled after
the flood received much less to cover immediate needs
such as transport, food, education and health, among
other unforeseeable costs, leaving little or no alloca-
tion for rebuilding houses. ZHRC (2014) and Muk-
washi (2019) observed that households which received
staggered compensation mostly built their houses from
poles and mud, structurally vulnerable to windstorms.
In 2019 windstorms destroyed more than 100 houses,
condemning them back to tents provided by NGOs and
the government (Maponga, 2019a).
The 600 households resettled in Chisase and
Masangula received the planned land-for-land com-
pensation (Chipangura et al., 2019). In contrast,
households in Chingwizi only received half a
hectare–designated by the government for sugarcane
production under irrigation, and another half for
constructing a homestead (Human Rights Watch
[HRW], 2015). Since the size of the land was smaller
than what the families previously owned in Tokwe-
Mukosi, the smallholder farmers lost land for growing
subsistence maize crops and small grains (ZHRC,
2014), individual and community gardening (Mutangi
& Mutari, 2014) and livestock production (Betera,
2014). The HRW (2015: 22) recorded an interview
where one former village leader expressed discontent
with the unilateral decision, saying: ‘‘…we are now
being forced to be sugarcane farmers. We have no
previous experience in sugarcane farming; neither do
we have an interest in it.’’ In Chingwizi, privately
owned land surrounded the households, leaving IDPs
with no land for livestock production. While house-
holds claimed that their livestock died due to lack of
pastures (Maponga, 2019b), compensation for these
losses was denied, with the government stating that the
law explicitly restricts compensation to improvements
and crops made at the place of origin (Vengesai &
Schmidt, 2018).
Since the MLGPW resettled the communities in
new village patterns, social networks were upset, with
losses in Chingwizi including disrupting extended
family members, church members, friends and village
neighbours (Atahar, 2014; Mutangi & Mutari, 2014;
Roca & Villares, 2012). These social networks carried
with them intangible opportunities such as microfi-
nance investment, locally known as mukando, based
on longstanding relationships of mutual trust (Mutangi
& Mutari, 2014). Previous state-orchestrated, post-
millennium displacements demonstrate that the Zim-
babwean government has no history of preserving
social networks when resettling IDPs. Potts (2008)
notes that during the 2005 Operation Murambatsvina
government evictions, the MLGPW trucks offloaded
some families near their communal areas, while it
randomly resettled others in former farmlands without
any spatial configuration considered.
Income losses included the loss of trade opportu-
nities. More than 24 informal traders from 12 affected
villages lost all their stock during the floods, as well as
loss of customers (Tarisayi, 2014). The informal
traders had mostly sold clothing, foodstuffs, and
electrical goods obtained from South Africa (Betera,
2014; Mavhura, 2020); others locally traded in fish,
fruits and vegetables grown in the nearby Runde
catchment area river sources (Mutangi & Mutari,
2014). After the disaster, the majority of traders in
Chingwizi had to survive by selling cheap products
made from natural resources such as reed mats,
baskets and grass brooms (Mukwashi, 2019). How-
ever, the ZHRC (2014) noted that the business was
unlucrative because similar products flooded the
market, and the clients, usually fellow IDPs, could
not purchase the products as they lacked stable income
sources. Additionally, the lack of property and busi-
ness insurance (Mavhura, 2020), compounded by a
lack of collateral assets to secure financial loans,
reduced IDPs’ access to the financial opportunities
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required for them to recover. Without security against
income shortfalls and alternative profitable livelihood
opportunities, displaced communities remained per-
petually deprived (Deeyah & Akujuru, 2017).
Importantly, the government only compensated
immovable property while overlooking essential
social infrastructure in the camp and new site.
Displaced households still live in areas with inade-
quate health, water and sanitation, education, com-
munity centres, transport and other essential
infrastructure (Mavhura, 2020). In Chingwizi, the
MLGPW built five schools, two clinics and 63
boreholes only after the arrival of the IDPs to the
resettlement sites (HRW, 2015), leaving a consider-
able shortfall from the initially planned development.
Previous dam related displacements in the country
show that once the state relocates IDPs, its support
dwindles, as documented by Makururu et al. (2018)
with respect to the state’s withdrawal from displaced
communities in Eastern Zimbabwe after the Osborne
dam construction. Almost 30 years after the dam’s
completion, the resettlement area still lacks physical
infrastructure like irrigation pipes, canals, schools and
clinics (ibid). In addition to boosting the income-
generating activities of the IDPs, Kalin (2014) notes
that upgrading infrastructure is also essential to reduce
tensions between IDPs and host communities.
Critical narratives also point to how the government
ignored compensation of cultural and spiritual losses
such as religious sites and gravesites (Mutangi &
Mutari, 2014). Mwandayi (2011) observed that graves
are an integral part of the traditional rituals of rural
households in Chivi district, which include rain making
ceremonies at the community level and protection at an
individual level. The compensation process fractured
the unacknowledged spiritual connection to religious
sites that provide meaning to the daily lives of ordinary
people. Hollenbach (2014) underscores the value of
religion and spirituality in helping people to cope with
trauma, reduce anxiety, gain social support and com-
mune with the sacred. While MLGPW has previously
assisted in relocation of the graves (Manyanhaire et al.,
2007), the speed with which the Tokwe-Mukosi disaster
occurred provided no time for exhumations to take
place. Even though alternative remedies could have
been sought, such as providing space for religious sites
in the resettlement area, an interviewee from the
MLGPW noted that the ministry could not provide
alternative remedies due to lack of funds. López-Carr
and Marter-Kenyon (2015) also suggest the relocation
of an entire village together to preserve cultural and
social network bonds, which MLGPW overlooked in
Chingwizi.
The compensation method used by MLGPW, which
focuses on immovable assets and any other damages the
affected households incur during the relocation process
(Vengesai & Schmidt, 2018) also ignores individual-
level losses, such as place-based knowledge from
longstanding relationship with animals, land, forests,
rivers, air and the sky, which takes years to establish. In
Chivi, this knowledge contributes to decision-making
on animal and human health, natural resource manage-
ment and agriculture (Maunganidze, 2016). Another
type of uncompensated individual level loss includes
significant leadership roles which vanished after the
displacement. Thirteen village leaders from Chekai,
Jahwa, Zifunzi, Mharadzano, Chikandigwa, Nemauzhe,
Tagwirei, Ndove, Matandandizvo, Mashenjere, Non-
gera, Chikosi, and Neruvanga (Bwerinofa & Kudzai-
Chiweshe, 2017), and two chiefs (Neruvanga and
Nemauzhe) lost their leadership roles (Betera, 2014).
These losses, while occurring at individual-level, tran-
scend individual boundaries by becoming intergenera-
tional losses of identity and knowledge.
While skills development and training plays a vital
role in long-term resettlement planning by allowing
IDPs to diversify their livelihoods (Mukwashi, 2017),
livelihood opportunities in most rural-to-rural resettle-
ment tend to focus only on the agricultural sector
(Tadgell et al., 2018) despite the fact that agricultural
livelihoods might be under threat in the new location (Al
Atahar, 2014). This observation resonated with the
Chingwizi agricultural focus, with the assumption that
the Ministry of Agriculture, Water, and Rural Resettle-
ment (MAWRR) would train the community in sugar-
cane production. Moreover, without irrigation,
Chingwizi faced more severe water shortages compared
to Tokwe-Mukosi, which existed near water sources
(Chazireni & Chigonda, 2018). Usamah and Haynes
(2012) underscore the importance for governments to
consider community preferences complemented with
both new and old skills training and long-term viability.
Based on the activities that the Chingwizi IDPs carried
out before and after the resettlement, alternative skills to
agriculture that could have been strengthened by the
government before resettlement include, but are not




The pre- and post-flood resettlement processes,
which we outline in Table 1, illustrate key develop-
ments in the construction of the Tokwe-Mukosi dam
and related plans regarding the sugar plantation,
electricity supply, fisheries, and recreation and tour-
ism facilities aimed at growing the provincial econ-
omy. Embedded in this timeline are also the
advocacies by IDPs and political elites dissatisfied
by the government resettlement processes. In 2014,
then Masvingo Provincial Affairs Minister Kudak-
washe Bhasikiti declared that IDPs had adequate relief
supplies (The Financial Gazette, 2014), despite wide-
spread shortages (Hove, 2016). However, after dis-
missal from his ministerial post, Bhasikiti, moved a
motion in parliament calling on the government to
complete the resettlement and irrigation scheme im-
mediately and provide full compensation to the IDPs
(The Financial Gazette, 2015b). In 2015, Bhasikiti’s
successor, Masvingo Provincial Affairs Minister,
Shuvai Mahofa vowed to resettle the IDPs in a better
place as they were currently ‘living in a place fit for
animals’ (The Financial Gazette, 2015a). Regardless
of the politicians’ admission that conditions in the
resettlement site were unsuitable, in 2014, the police
arrested the Chingwizi camp committee leadership,
including the chairperson, Mike Mudyanembwa, for
protesting the conditions (HRW, 2015), with the
courts sentencing him to a five-year jail term in 2015.
Subsequently, Minister Bhasikiti accused the Ching-
wizi camp committee leaders of influencing the flood
survivors to reject resettlement without compensation,
which he claimed, the majority of flood survivors
wanted (ibid).
State power and the resettlement processes
Diverse forms of exercising power
in the resettlement processes
The nexus between state power and the Tokwe-
Mukosi resettlement processes started from the con-
ception of the dam project and has no end in sight as
the IDPs still live in limbo. Our analysis shows that the
construction of the dam and the subsequent resettle-
ment objectives depict clear state-driven capitalist
values. The intended 25,000-hectare sugarcane irriga-
tion project in the province involving the IDPs
(Betera, 2014) alters the agricultural livelihoods of
the households from being subsistence farmers to
commercial farmers, constituting a cultivation of
powerless and exploitable neoliberal subjects who
neither have control over what to grow nor market
forces. Additionally, the dam-related recreation and
tourism facilities meant to grow the provincial econ-
omy benefit only the few elites with sufficient capital
to invest in the hospitality industry (Mukwashi, 2017),
with little benefit to the IDPs’ quality of life. Central
government, through MFED, demonstrated its prior-
ities after the disaster when it focused on completion
of the dam while neglecting IDPs’ compensation
(Government of Zimbabwe [GoZ], 2014). The pro-
cesses of reducing disaster risk for the Tokwe-Mukosi
community created new patterns of winners and losers
reflected in the resettlement of the IDPs with capitalist
motives of enriching the state’s elite and forcing IDPs
into a market economy. IDPs rather than benefitting
from development now endure hegemonic ideals of
disconnection to place, destruction of social networks
and a drive towards commercial-oriented agricultural
production.
The state used its monopoly of power, exercised
through MFED, MLGPW, ZRP, and ZNA to decide
what was desirable to reduce disaster risk. The purpose
and siting of the dam project was the state’s concep-
tion (Mukwashi, 2017). MFED controlled the value of
compensation and payment terms, while MLGPW
advanced a narrative that perceived IDPs’ demands for
compensation as improper (Mavhura, 2020). ZRP and
ZNA controlled access to humanitarian resources in
the camp and were instrumental in forcefully evicting
IDPs from the camp (Hove, 2016). MLGPW deter-
mined the location of the new settlement, including the
settlement patterns and land use in the new site
(Mukwashi, 2017). MLGPW excluded traditional
authorities from the resettlement processes and abol-
ished their authority in the new site (Mutangi &
Mutari, 2014; Tarisayi, 2018). Since the dam comple-
tion in 2017, IDPs are yet to benefit from the promised
dam projects. As argued by Ingalls and Stedman
(2016), hegemonic application of social power results
in privileging the interests of some actors over others,
which creates distributional inequalities. We contend
that the inequality and accumulation of power in the
state’s elite is increasing rather than reducing vulner-
ability. As such, we argue that it is essential for
scholars to focus clearly on power relations, avoiding






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































individuals, communities and nations to coping with
challenges of displacement.
There were three main ways in which the IDPs were
resettled, attributable to different circumstances and
preferences. The first resettlement way was without
direct physical force. MLGPW resettled households
either directly to their permanent sites from Tokwe-
Mukosi or after briefly staying in the camp before
‘volunteering’ to move to the permanent site. How-
ever, Oxfam observed that: ‘…some households had
to carry their belongings from the road to their plots
walking approximately 4 km into the bush looking for
their pegs. The plots were not cleared, neither were
they habitable. Each family was allocated tarpaulin
plastic sheeting without timber…’ (Oxfam, 2014: 6).
Voluntary resettlement of encamped IDPs continued
until the forced closure of the camp. During the first
author’s visit in April 2014, the Mwenezi District
Administrator explained that the government was
offering free transport to families who volunteered to
resettle to permanent sites. That same month, the then-
MLGPW minister, Ignatius Chombo, threatened to
stop providing relief to the IDPs, if they declined to
move out of the camp to the one-hectare plots without
compensation; only 400 out of over 18,000 yielded to
the pressure (Hove, 2016). Here the state apparatus
used economic force to enforce the will of elites.
The second method of resettlement involved the
police and army’s use of outright physical force. After
the majority of the IDPs refused to move out of the
camp without compensation, the government relo-
cated the clinic to the final resettlement site in early
August (Hove, 2016). The IDPs protested violently,
disarming anti-riot police and burning two ZRP
vehicles in the process (HRW, 2015). In mid-August,
ZRP and armed ZNA soldiers arrested over 300 IDPs,
destroyed the temporary shelters, and ordered every-
one to the new resettlement site (Hove, 2016).
Violence was further augmented by the fact that the
Nuanetsi ranch where Chingwizi is situated had
disputed ownership, claimed by Development Trust
of Zimbabwe (DTZ), a company aligned to the ruling
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
(ZANU-PF) party (Hove, 2016). Reviewed literature
shows conflicts even before the 2014 resettlement.
Mujere and Dombo (2011) report that in 2010, DTZ
obtained a court order to evict twenty-five households
and their 12,000 cattle from the ranch during the























































































































































































































































































































































































Programme. These existing tensions continue to
threaten to evolve into another displacement for the
IDPs leading to another disconnection of place, people
and livelihoods. In 2019, tensions over grazing land
and water sources led the Minister of State for
Masvingo Provincial Affairs, Ezra Chadzamira, to
plead for dialogue saying: ‘‘You can share the
available resources, especially water…it is very
disturbing to note that families here have livestock
which has no access to grazing pastures because
grazing lands have been fenced off’’ (The Herald,
2019). Mavhura (2020) also recently reported tribal
tensions between the resettled Karanga community
and the hosting Shangani community over the sharing
of arable land and pastures. Apart from potential
displacement, the prohibition to own cattle by the
MLGPW, and conflicts with the host community over
livestock production disconnected the IDPs from
cattle rearing, one of the only thriving livelihoods in
the district (Chiruvu et al., 2017).
The third type of resettlement was self-settlement
outside Chingwizi after the violence. The IDPs either
moved to other places of choice within Chivi (Zikhali,
2018) or back to the original resettlement site (Hove,
2016). Zikhali (2018) notes that IDPs who moved to
various parts of Chivi District were in search of
autonomy from government control, agricultural land
for livestock and crop farming. IDPs who moved back
to Tokwe-Mukosi still had habitable homesteads,
unaffected by the floods (ZHRC, 2014), despite the
risk of future flooding. Since most households
remained in Chingwizi, the returnees also risked
limited physical connection to families and neigh-
bours in Tokwe-Mukosi. The government, however,
vowed to evict those who had resettled in the dam
basin (Hove, 2016). The self-settlement reflects the
preference by many IDPs to pursue self-defined
vulnerability reduction characterised by autonomy
and preference for settlement and livelihood opportu-
nities outside the limits of state-defined vulnerability
reduction.
Unsuitable settlement (Encampment)
at Chingwizi: a centre of state-perpetuated
violence
One of the government’s justifications for setting up
the camp was creating a central logistical coordination
for meeting IDPs’ humanitarian needs (Betera, 2014).
However, Samu and Kentel (2018) point out that the
government met the humanitarian needs of IDPs in the
country’s previous emergencies without encamping
the victims, noting that in 2000, aid agencies provided
humanitarian aid to more than 500,000 Cyclone Eline
survivors in the Limpopo and the Save River basin,
without encamping them. Therefore, using this argu-
ment for encampment seems disingenuous.
Moreover, World Food Programme and other
humanitarian agencies barely met the critical food
and non-food requirements (Betera, 2014) in the
Chingwizi camp. One flood survivor interviewed by
the CCJPZ (2014) summed up the challenges in the
camp by saying:
We have inadequate food and shelter. Sanitary,
ablution and healthcare facilities are scarce. We
do not have boreholes or any reliable clean
source of water. The tents that were donated as a
form of shelter are few and therefore crow-
ded…We do not have schools and our children
have been out of school for long…We are not
sure when the situation will improve (CCJP,
2014: 9).
Even though the central government set up the
camp supposedly to provide physical security to the
large number of IDPs, it became a centre of state
perpetrated violence and abuse (Hove, 2016). Mad-
zokere (2018) notes that the police failed to adequately
prevent the host community from stealing donated
goods as the outsiders masqueraded as IDPs. Betera
(2014) also reports that ZRP officers and state officials
stole the supplies the community expected them to
protect and equitably distribute. While the MLGPW
assumed greater control of aid distribution by direct-
ing that all aid pass through the Minister of State for
Masvingo Provincial Affairs, Hove (2016) argues that
authorities diverted donated goods to sell these in the
surrounding towns of Triangle and Chiredzi leading to
significant losses of aid meant for IDPs. Typical of
camps, the police enforced restricted movement in and
out of the camp (HRW, 2015), restricting livelihood
opportunities for IDPs in employment, pastures and
firewood (Bakewell, 2014). Towards the closure of the
camp, the police and army, through the MLGPW
directive, denied and limited food and water, blocked
toilets and closed the school and the clinic to force the
IDPs out of the camp (Hove, 2016). The camp was,
therefore, a centre of wielding power and control
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instead of being a haven for providing much-needed
protection and personal security so that IDPs could
swiftly revert to normal life.
Moreover, there was an increase in transactional
sex in exchange for humanitarian aid controlled by
male police officers. One survivor interviewed by the
CCJPZ (2014) confirmed this view saying: ‘‘…
vulnerable groups such as women and children have
sacrificed themselves to access the few donations.
Prostitution in exchange for humanitarian aid has
become common.’’ Sexually transmitted diseases
increased, and about 100 teenage girls between the
ages of ten and twelve fell pregnant and dropped out of
school (Hove, 2016). The camps, instead of being
sanctuaries of safety, increased the risk of exploitation
and abuse.
While the clinic in the camp facilitated access to
health services, the conditions at the camp exacerbated
the vulnerability of the IDPs to various diseases.
Sanitation coverage was inadequate and on arrival at
the camp, IDPs had no access to safe drinking water.
With the nearest safe water source, a borehole, 30 km
away, the IDPs relied on uncovered stagnant water
pools for domestic water use (Oxfam, 2014). The
inadequate water and sanitation conditions increased
diarrhoeal disease, with 60 cases recorded in the health
camp facility in March 2014 alone (United Nations
Development Programme, 2017). In total, seven
fatalities occurred in the camp, compared to the six
who drowned during the flood (Hove, 2016). The
camp registered increased malaria and tuberculosis
cases, there was no ambulance to transport the sick,
and the clinic structure, a makeshift tent, was inade-
quate for the provision of quality care (United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
[UNOCHA], 2014). Results from a March 2014
Ministry of Health and Child Care survey in Mwenezi
district on the nutritional status of children under the
age of five revealed that 2% of children in Chingwizi
received a minimum acceptable diet compared to 68%
of children living outside the camp (Chiruvu et al.,
2017). The health and nutrition situation in the camp
was inconsistent with assisting the IDPs towards
recovery.
An estimated 800 primary and 500 secondary
school pupils missed school in the early days at the
camp (Madzokere, 2018). During the first author’s
visit to the camp in April of 2014, it was learned that
only one teacher was available to teach all the primary
and secondary pupils under one makeshift tent.
Vulnerable to various weather elements such as rain
and cold, pupils sat on the ground due to furniture
shortages, in addition to lack of toys, books, water and
sanitation facilities for the school (UNOCHA, 2014).
Some 400 pupils dropped out of school to fend either
for themselves or their families (Hove, 2016), further
exacerbating future opportunities.
Mujere and Dombo (2011) highlight that cattle
production is a significant enterprise in the Chingwizi
area. Apart from their consumption, cattle are an
essential facet of Zimbabwe’s rural economy–used for
transportation of inputs and produce, firewood and
water; capital growth and storage, through herd
growth; tillage; and cultural ceremonies such as
paying bride prices (Matope et al., 2020). Despite
the importance of livestock production in Chingwizi,
there is no record of training the community on animal
husbandry to reconnect the IDPs to their farming
activities; many cattle acquired diseases (UNOCHA,
2014), and, as noted above, there was no compensation
for those who lost livestock during the flood or
transportation. Tarisayi (2014) established that the
IDPs lost goats, sheep and cattle during the floods, and
Mutangi and Mutari (2014) noted that others died on
their way to the transit camp. The MAWRR thus
missed critical livestock support opportunities that
could have improved the lives of the IDPs in
Chingwizi.
Unfulfilled promises
Three main policy reforms were flagged for action but
remain unfulfilled, related, respectively to legislative
reform, compensation guidance and management of
camps. In a 2014 report produced by the Directorate of
Civil Protection assessing the management of the
Tokwe-Mukosi disaster (Betera, 2014), a review was
recommended of the Civil Protection Act of 1989, the
principal law governing disaster risk reduction in the
country. Mavhura (2016: 611) notes that the Act uses
‘a command-and-control model derived from a mili-
taristic system.’ Moreover, Sect. 29 to 37 of the Act
establishes funding at a national level through the
National Civil Protection Fund (GoZ, 1989), without
establishing such funding at the local level where the
disasters occur. The local authorities barely receive
funding from the central government before disasters
occur (Mavhura, 2016), such that the central
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government only avails resources after a disaster,
tightly controlling the funds needed for community
disaster risk reduction. Parliament failed to amend the
legislative framework several times since 2003
(Mavhura, 2016), despite the view by Capacity for
Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI, 2017) that the
proposed 2011 bill was antagonistic to the SFDRR by
ignoring long-term needs. While an interviewed legal
expert argued that such laws were unjust and hence
unconstitutional and undemocratic, two interviewed
members of parliament blamed the affected commu-
nities themselves for not challenging the injustices.
Our analysis conforms with that of Cretney (2017),
namely that the promotion of neoliberal policies to
boost economic growth and enforce political legiti-
macy undermine resilience to forced displacement
related to climate-induced and other disasters. We
contend that the state’s resistance to amending the
legislative framework, based on this desire to maintain
hegemonic opportunities for control and authority, is
counterproductive to social equity.
Revised compensation guidelines, also recom-
mended by the report, are yet to be developed or
made public and the complex interplay of state
institutions, politicians, and non-state actors regarding
responsibility for forced displacements remains unad-
dressed. Notably, in this regard, the district council
officers with whom the second author met in other
parts of the country in 2019, acknowledge that
political considerations were behind their reluctance
to endorse the recommendations in a NGO report that
called for fundamental changes in resettlement and
compensation policy. Deeyah and Akujuru (2017)
conceptualise compensation as fault finding, where the
guilty party recompenses the victim. If state institu-
tions adopt this same conceptualisation of compensa-
tion, then victims of disaster-induced displacement
might stand to lose amidst blame shifting on respon-
sibility to act before, during and after a disaster. For
instance, in the Muzarabani and Mbire floods, sur-
vivors blamed their Rural District Council for neglect-
ing them during the disaster and the district councillors
blamed the survivors for settling in flood-prone areas
(Mucherera & Mavhura, 2020; Ncube-Phiri et al.,
2014). While compensation guidelines might be a
lifeline for affected rural households known to live
without insurance schemes (Mucherera & Mavhura,
2020), the state’s reluctance to engage in developing
new guidelines cannot be seen as mere oversight. Such
an effort would raise the question of whose knowledge
and values matter when considering what to compen-
sate and how much it is worth.
In this vein, it is telling that various interviewees in
Chimanimani District in early 2020 articulated diverse
views on why a private company–Econet–ultimately
did not follow through with its publicly-announced
commitment in 2019 to fund a resettlement housing
programme for Cyclone Idai IDPs. Some narratives
indicated that it was powerful national government
elites (not government officials in the district) who
rejected the proposal fearing that the model might be
‘‘too good.’’ One critique was that political elites did
not want to create a scenario where Econet (owned by
a businessman with rumoured political aspirations)
might claim too much of the credit. Another narrative
was that officials feared creating a precedent that
housing structure programs for resettlement commu-
nities would be better than for others; yet another
narrative was that ‘‘Econet was lying and did not have
a budget committed with the promises.
In a more recent 2021 case, the Chilonga commu-
nity in Chiredzi district, south east of Chivi district, is
on the verge of being evicted from their communal
lands without compensation. An interviewee from
Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development
decried the combined business community and state
collusion in oppressing rural communities, noting that
the land in Chilonga was earmarked for lucerne grass
production for Dendairy, a private dairy company in
Zimbabwe. The grass will be irrigated using water
from the Tokwe-Mukosi dam, despite Chilonga being
further downstream. One interviewee from the Mas-
vingo Centre for Research and Advocacy highlighted
that MLGPW took advantage of the absence of a
compensation framework to publish Statutory Instru-
ment 50 of 2021 followed by Statutory instrument 63A
of 2021 to evict at least 12, 500 indigenous Shangani
households from their Chilonga communal land. The
legal expert interviewee emphasised that even though
the MLGPW evoked the Communal Land Act and
crafted the statutory instruments, the move was
unconstitutional because Sect. 74 of the constitution
guarantees every Zimbabwean the right to a home–the
Chilonga community were being displaced from a
place they call home. In addition, the eviction lacked
authorisation from a court of law and failed to consider
alternative remedies before the ensuing eviction.
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The Chilonga case points to the dam’s far reaching
effects in adding to the constellation of already
existing injustices. The arbitrary eviction for capitalist
gains and lack of compensation without alternative
land and infrastructure provision emphasize the unre-
lenting use of state power under the guise of disaster
risk reduction. Additionally, the Chilonga case echoes
the Tokwe-Mukosi displacement saga, underscoring
how the failure to meaningfully apply the lessons from
Tokwe-Mukosi are resulting in repetitions of resettle-
ment injustices.
Regarding encampment practices, despite the myr-
iad of challenges observed in CTC, the central
government still adopted encampment in response to
the Cyclone Dineo and Idai disasters, the two signif-
icant disasters after the Tokwe-Mukosi. Similar to
CTC, in Tsholotsho, during Cyclone Dineo, IDPs
experienced inadequate food security, water and
sanitation, slept communally due to shortage of tents
in the camp which deprived the IDPs of privacy and
increased the risk of communicable diseases (Depart-
ment of Civil Protection, 2017). Significantly, 953
(3%) of Cyclone Idai IDPs in Chimanimani are
encamped and experiencing these similar challenges,
almost 17 months after the disaster (UNOCHA,
2020). Given the drawbacks of large encamped
vulnerable populations and the ongoing COVID-19
(Coronavirus) pandemic (Kassem & Jaafar, 2020), the
camp setup is widely seen as a health timebomb.
However, since camps are spaces for consolidation of
power through securitisation and resource control
(Jacobs & Kyamusugulwa, 2018), other alternatives
can be a threat to the established power in camps.
The choice by 97% of the Cyclone Idai IDPs to stay
with the host community consisting of relatives and
friends (UNOCHA, 2020), highlights a form of
resistance to widespread control and underlying
injustices in camp setups. Indeed, the second author
of this study found multiple people affected by
Cyclone Idai, in Chimanimani, who referenced the
Tokwe-Mukosi saga when discussing their own fears
of being ‘‘forgotten’’ and ‘‘ignored’’ if they just waited
in tents in camps. That camps are also places where
neoliberal corporate and economic elites manipulate
shocked populations was not lost on the Chimanimani
flood survivors. Our observation concurs with that of
Bhagat (2020) who also notes that protracted encamp-
ment supports neoliberal tendencies through increased
authoritarian surveillance and institution-led survival
strategies of self-reliance such as microfinance and
entrepreneurship. While some literature frames IDPs
as passive victims (Priorelli, 2021), the challenge to
encampment in Chimanimani illustrates resistance to
power inequalities tied to superficial efforts of poverty
alleviation and a potential opportunity for alternatives
to encampment. Unfortunately, the host communities
in Chimanimani now bear the burden of food and
shelter provision for the IDPs without external
support. Many of the NGOs that were ready to provide
resettlement support in the year and half after Cyclone
Idai were constricted in their efforts, at times because
they were told that Econet was going to do it (before
the Econet project plan fell through), resulting in
opportunities lost. Similarly, IDPs in Tsholotsho
returned to unrepaired dilapidated homes devoid of
food and other welfare needs (Dube et al., 2018;
UNOCHA, 2020), while those in Chingwizi settled on
bare ground without assistance. This practice is,
however, consistent with neoliberal norms and values
of dismantling state welfare for IDPs (Bhagat, 2020),
demonstrating an unrestrained application of power
against the values of disaster risk reduction.
Conclusion
The pre- and post-flood induced resettlement pro-
cesses in the Tokwe-Mukosi disaster illustrated how
state power shaped the form of community vulnera-
bility during forced resettlement processes. Our
research draws attention to how broader systems of
injustices (Boonstra, 2016; Fabinyi et al., 2014; Ingalls
& Stedman, 2016; Taylor, 2015) increase vulnerabil-
ity, with Zimbabwe’s case study showing how capi-
talist motives and values impoverished its powerless
subjects rather than building their resilience. As
Newman (2010) argues, the state can act as a tool to
perpetuate capitalism as well as a locus of power to
protect its interests. Here the Zimbabwean state,
through its institutions (MFED, MLGPW, ZRP and
ZNA), used the disaster to promote a new vision of
security in an uncertain future (Aradau, 2014), while
expanding capitalist accumulation processes at the
expense of communities in need of its protection.
By mapping the Tokwe-Mukosi pre- and post-flood
period, we illustrated the complexity of resettlement
processes, showing how the flood disaster catalysed
and threw the planned processes into disarray when
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unanticipated torrential rainfall unexpectedly filled the
dam. IDPs’ vulnerability increased throughout the
resettlement processes, with the MLGPW, MFED,
ZRP and ZNA using their power to create losses in
land sizes, compensation, social networks, livelihood
opportunities, social infrastructure, cultural and reli-
gious sites, place-based knowledge, and individual-
level losses and reducing the ability of the IDPs to
restore their livelihoods in what, for them would be
fair, equitable and inclusive ways.
Regarding how state power contributes to the
vulnerability of the Tokwe-Mukosi communities’
forced resettlement, our findings revealed multi-
faceted state power relationships during forced reset-
tlement processes. First, the central government
conceived the dam project and unilaterally decided
how the displaced communities would return to
normal functioning by dictating where the IDPs would
resettle, the livelihood opportunities on which they
would embark, and the resettlement pattern, which
affected the IDPs’ connection to livelihoods, people
and the new place. During the flood disaster, the state
decided the resettlement trajectory of the IDPs, which
began by MLGPW randomly resettling them in the
CTC, tearing connections between people. In the
camp, the state controlled access to food, water,
sanitation, shelter, health and education needs for the
IDPs. Instead of meeting the physical security needs of
the community, the courts convicted camp committee
leaders while the MLGPW, police and army ended up
violently evicting the IDPs from the camp without
compensation, thereby affecting the IDPs’ ability to
revert to normal life. Shaping the level of vulnerability
reduction by controlling IDPs’ connections to place,
people and livelihoods, state institution actions pro-
moted conditions that reproduced and increased
poverty.
Ignoring the main lessons that could have been
acted upon in the aftermath of the Tokwe-Mukosi
resettlement process, the parliament, first, failed to
review the militarised Civil Protection Act, which we
interpret as a way of maintaining grip on a status quo
that provides hegemonic opportunities for control and
authority. Second, the central government is yet to
craft the guidelines for compensating IDPs, raising
questions about whose knowledge and values are
being used to decide what to compensate and to what
value. Third, the central government is yet to review
its encampment practices, which may be maintained to
retain neoliberal norms and values of authoritarian
surveillance and consolidation of power. Ultimately,
the resettlement processes point to the critical need for
theorising varied displacement types and experiences,
linking protracted struggles with power dynamics that
span multiple scales.
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